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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
March madness? 
In the aftermath of the 15 March hijacking of a Russian Vnukovo Airline Plane 
returning from Turkey (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 19 Mar 01), Sadettin Tanta 
and Vladimir Rushailo, the Turkish and Russian interior ministers, spoke over the 
phone: They discussed "ways of intensifying the struggle against all 
manifestations of international terrorism" and "agreed to exchanges of 
information and experts. (INTERFAX, 1333 GMT, 19 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0319, via World News Connection) 
 
The Russians have also increased security in airports, railway stations and bus 
terminals. (INTERFAX, 1434 GMT, 19 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0319, via World 
News Connection) There are those, however, who doubt whether Russian 
security measures are effective in light of recent events. In the past two weeks 
there has been a spate of incidents which the Kremlin links to Chechen 
separatists. 
 
Between 17 and 20 March ten civilians -- eight Russians and two Chechens -- 
were murdered in their homes in the Leninsky District of Grozny. The 
investigators of the local prosecutor's office claimed that fighters are "trying to 
scare city residents and destabilize the situation." (ITAR-TASS, 0631 GMT, 20 
Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0320, via World News Connection) 
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Eight more persons -- six Russians and two Georgians -- were killed by 23 
March. (RIA, 0910 GMT, 23 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0323, via World News 
Connection) 
 
On the next day three car bombs went off almost simultaneously in the Stavropol 
Region towns of Mineral'nyye Vody and Yessentyuki and in the Karachevo-
Cherkessia village of Adyge-Khabl. Twenty-three persons were killed and more 
than 130 injured. On Monday, 26 March, a Day of Mourning for the Victims of the 
blast was held. (ITAR-TASS, 0830 GMT, 26 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0326, via 
World News Connection)  
 
An earlier civilian reaction to the events was a roadblock of concrete blocks, 
burnt cars, tree trunks and vans with slogans like "Say no to murders, mopping-
up operations, robbery and camps" and "Where are you, Chechnya's leaders, 
where is the mufti, where are the judges, because we are being killed with your 
consent." Hundreds of women guarded the 1.5-kilometer roadblock. (INTERFAX, 
1307 GMT, 20 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0320, via World News Connection) 
 
Other, non-fatal, explosions included a landmine hit by a vehicle in which four 
police officers were injured, a car bomb in Moscow that injured a father and 
daughter, and an explosion in a train near the Chechen city of Gudermes. 
(INTERFAX, 1111 GMT, 28 Mar 01, and RIA, 0533 GMT, 28 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0328, via World News Connection; and RIA, 0959 GMT, 29 Mar 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0329, via World News Connection) 
 
In addition, according to the then-Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo, 61 
bombings had been prevented "at the stage of planting explosive substances or 
explosive devices" between 19 and 26 March. (INTERFAX, 1248 GMT, 27 Mar 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0327, via World News Connection) There are rumors that 
recent events in Chechnya constituted one of the factors that led to Rushailo's 
replacement by Unity faction leader Boris Gryzlov. 
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To oversee the investigation and to help the victims and their families, a top-level 
anti-terrorist unit for "public security, post-crises rehabilitation and urgent 
assistance," was formed by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov on President 
Putin's order. On 26 March the group flew out to the Stavropol Territory where 
the terrorist attacks took place. Headed by FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, the 
group includes Russian Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, Deputy Interior 
Minister Ivan Golubev, Stavropol Governor Alexander Chernogorov, the 
Kremlin's envoy to the Southern Federal District, Viktor Kazantsev, Deputy 
Finance Minister Andrei Petrov, Deputy Director of the FSB German Ugryumov, 
and Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko. Investigation teams from the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of the Interior (MVD) as well as a special 
brigade of explosion experts have also been ordered to fly to the region. 
(INTERFAX, 1210 GMT, 24 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0324, via World News 
Connection; OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROADCAST; 27 
Mar 01; Federal News Service, via lexis-nexis; and ITAR-TASS, 1325 GMT, 26 
Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0326, via World News Connection)  
 
There are several theories to explain the increased terrorist activity. General 
Ustinov suggested that "it's all about money. The gunmen need to prove that 
they have done work for it. It is no accident that they record everything on film -- 
to report back to those who pay them money." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 27 
Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0327, via World News Connection) Security Council 
Secretary Sergey Ivanov asserted at a briefing in Kaliningrad that "leaders of 
Chechen bandit formations" picked up their fighting because they have been 
"confronted with a coherent, predictable and clear-cut policy of the federal 
center." Presidential Aide Sergey Yastrzhembsky said that according to recent 
intelligence reports, rebels considered some retaliation after the arrest of Ruslan 
Akhmadov and Badrudi Murtazayev in Baku. (ITAR-TASS, 1442 GMT, 24 Mar 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0324, via World News Connection) Other federal military 
and security officials propose that rebels are reacting to the anticipated transfer 
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of the Chechen administration to Grozny and also timing the "various acts of 
terrorism and sabotage to the coming May Day holidays." (INTERFAX, 1248 
GMT, 27 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0327, via World News Connection) Finally, if 
the recent attacks constitute an intentional statement, they could also be related 
to the transfer of control over operations in Chechnya to the security services or 
to the mass graves recently found near two Chechen towns. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 19 Mar 01) 
 
Don't put off until tomorrow 
In the meanwhile the security services will have a respite from participating in 
three of the more publicized court cases: The murder trial of Russian General 
Yuri Budanov, the "state treason" trial of military journalist Grigory Pasko, and the 
"espionage" trial against scientist Igor Sutyagin all have been postponed. 
 
JUDICIARY 
Judicial reform 
Together with the repeated acclaims of the Chechen Republic's justice ministry 
and the decreased number of prisoners in Russia, there has been much 
discussion on the subject of judicial reform. 
 
Full details of the proposed changes to be presented to the Duma in mid- to late-
April have not been released, but putative items on the agenda, as related by 
Igor Artemev, deputy head of the YABLOKO faction who has worked on the 
proposal, would include: changes in the process of selecting judges, broadening 
rights of the defense, curtailing the power of the prosecutor's office, salary 
increases for judges, reconstruction of courthouses, and the introduction of jury 
trials to the 82 Russian Federation regions that currently do not have jury trials.  
 
One important aspect of the prosecutor's power that has not been considered, 
according to Artemev, is the right to "conduct an investigation into a criminal case 
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and at the same time supervise the observance of the law during the 
investigation." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Mar 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Loose lips lose memberships 
Two deputies, Rafakh Abdul-Vahid Niyazov and Konstantin Svenarda, have been 
expelled from the ever-more-powerful Unity bloc of the Russian State Duma for 
speaking on behalf of the faction without the authorization of Unity leaders. 
According to faction head Boris Gryzlov, both had been warned, but continued to 
make unauthorized statements in order to pursue their own personal and 
commercial goals. (ITAR-TASS, 1420 GMT, 20 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0320, 
via World News Connection) 
 
The two spots were still warm when Igor Lisinenko, vice president of the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and deputy head of the Duma property 
committee, as well as Vladimir Semenkov, deputy head of the Duma committee 
for public health and sports, were admitted to the Unity faction. Lisinenko 
previously was a representative of the Fatherland-All Russia bloc, and Semenkov 
had been elected to the Duma as a member of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic 
Party bloc, but withdrew from that party three months ago to become an 
independent member of parliament. (ITAR-TASS, 1055 GMT, 22 Mar 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0322, via World News Connection)  
 
Another change to the Unity bloc is expected shortly, when a replacement for 
Boris Gryzlov, current faction leader appointed interior minister on 28 March, is to 
be announced. (RIA, 0615 GMT, 29 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0329, via World 
News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
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US-Russian relations: cool winds are blowing 
A chill in US-Russian relations has become more evident. In the latest diplomatic 
spat, the largest number of expulsions of "diplomats" from either side in recent 
years has been announced. This development, however, is just another 
manifestation of the cooling of US-Russian relations, which has become more 
apparent since January. 
 
The most recent episode opened with the US announcement that 50 Russian 
"diplomats" would be expelled. This followed the Robert Hanssen spy case -- an 
FBI officer charged with over 15 years of spying for Russia. Moscow then 
announced the expulsion of 50 US diplomats from Russia. (THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, 24 Mar 01) At the same time, Presidents Bush and Putin expressed 
doubts that the spy spat would have a lasting effect on US-Russian relations. 
Putin said that he "didn't think the expulsions would cause further damage," while 
Bush said that he believed the US "can have good, strong relations with Russia." 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 25 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) However, rhetoric 
cannot paper over the deepening fissure in US-Russian relations. 
 
It is becoming clear increasingly that US-Russian relations are rough at best. 
After eight years of a "blanket engagement" strategy pursued by the Clinton 
administration, the administration is taking an independent and proactive 
approach to Russia based upon US interests. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 14 
Feb 01) Recognizing the various areas of contention between the US and 
Russia, the administration has begun to reevaluate relations with Russia, starting 
first with economic aid once lavished on the new "democratic" Russia. In a 
statement last week, Bush singled out the nuclear arms reduction program 
cooperation with Russia, saying, "We're reviewing all programs ... related to de-
escalating potential nuclear problems... We want to make sure that any money is 
being spent in an effective way." (REUTERS, 30 Mar 01; via RussiaToday.com) 
The US has also voiced increasing concern about Russian arms sales to a 
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variety of "rogue states," particularly Iran, and has expressed its misgivings about 
the Russian war against Chechnya.  
 
In this vein, the spy spat is just another signal to Russia that Washington will 
undertake policies that protect US interests, especially on its own soil. This new 
approach came across in President Bush's statements following the Russian 
expulsions: "They'll just [have to] understand [that] my administration is one that 
takes firm positions when we think we're right." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 25 
Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Moscow now alleges that the US is painting Russia as the "evil empire" in an 
attempt to justify a more hawkish policy. In the wake of the expulsions and news 
of a secret US tunnel under the Russian embassy in Washington, Russian 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko claimed, in effect, that the 
expulsions were a political ploy to push through NMD. "Under strained relations, 
it is easier to deploy National Missile Defense," he commented. (ITAR-TASS, 24 
Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) In Washington, however, Russian Ambassador Yuri 
Ushakov took the tunnel revelations in stride, suggesting "perhaps we could use 
it as a sauna." (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 26 Mar 01; via lexis-
nexis) All joking aside, it will require more than words to compose these and 
other differences. 
 
Putin's European gambit: a forum for anti-American rhetoric 
As the new US administration pledged a more independent policy, Russia sought 
engagement elsewhere. In recent weeks, Putin accepted an unprecedented 
invitation to the European Union summit in Stockholm, where he took advantage 
of the media spotlight to rebuff Western criticism of his domestic policies -- 
specifically regarding Chechnya -- and level accusations of his own against the 
US. 
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Although the meeting resulted in few concrete rewards, Putin used his half-day 
appearance to deepen Russian political and economic involvement with the EU. 
After months of international criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya, Putin used 
the visit to lobby the EU for increased economic cooperation. In exchange for his 
efforts, EU members agreed to drop import duties on some Russian metals as 
well as to extend Russia an $89 million loan for environmental cleanup. 
Regarding the EU's future, Putin expressed concern for Russian interests, 
especially in Kaliningrad, but said that expansion is an issue for EU countries to 
decide. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 24 Mar 01; FBIS-WEU-2001-0326, via World 
News Connection) 
 
As Putin reached out to Europe on economic and trade issues, his tough, anti-US 
stance on strategic and European security issues never wavered. When 
commenting on the EU's -- and Russia's -- decision to pledge full political support 
to Macedonia, Putin compared the unfolding events in Macedonia to those in 
Chechnya, calling the Albanian separatists not just rebels, but terrorists. Putin 
attempted to legitimize his government's war in Chechnya by urging that tactics 
similar to those used against the Chechens be used in Macedonia. "They are 
terrorists, not rebels, and they must be dealt with in a robust manner or else they 
will create conditions that will leave Europe quaking in its boots," Putin argued. 
(THE WASHINGTON POST, 24 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) Likewise, during his 
Balkan visit last week, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov also compared 
Macedonia to Chechnya, saying that the region is a "flashpoint of extremism and 
terrorism, not unlike Chechnya," and as a result, the "most important task will be 
to develop a reliable security system." (ITAR-TASS, 0214 GMT, 26 Mar 01; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
Putin also used the Stockholm setting to level his own set of accusations against 
Western -- read US -- involvement in the Balkans. Putin specifically criticized 
NATO for its failure to "disarm the terrorists" in the region. (THE WASHINGTON 
POST, 24 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) In an article in Krasnaya zvezda, former 
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Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev also accused the US of being directly 
responsible for the current fighting in Macedonia, saying that the present events 
"are a result of separatism encouraged... by US political and financial assistance 
to Albanian national extremist organizations." (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Mar 01; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
While condemning the Albanian extremists, the West continues to urge restraint 
in Macedonia while ignoring Russian criticisms. In contrast to Moscow's calls for 
a military response to the rebels, US Secretary of State Colin Powell has 
counseled Macedonia to reach out to its ethnic Albanian minority, saying that the 
US and NATO "think that there is a way to deal with this that would not cause yet 
another Balkan war." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 23 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) 
Washington also has disregarded Russian criticism of last week's meeting in 
Washington with Chechen Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov. In reaction to the 
meeting, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov spoke of Russia's "dim view" 
of US actions. (ITAR-TASS, 1305 GMT, 27 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0327, via 
World News Connection) The chairman of the Russian State Duma's 
International Affairs Committee, Dmitri Rogozin, however, said that "we have 
solid grounds to add the US to those who officially support terrorism." 
(INTERFAX, 0735 GMT, 27 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0327, via World News 
Connection) 
 
While the spy spat may blow over soon, the poor state of US-Russian relations 
that it characterizes probably will not. Deep US-Russian differences -- over Iran, 
Iraq, China, North Korea, India, etc. -- seem to span the spectrum of international 
and bilateral issues. The Putin administration is taking its anti-American rhetoric 
across the globe in an apparent attempt to improve Russia's financial and 
diplomatic position and develop relations that might help balance US 
"hegemony." As a case in point, Putin's recent initiative in Europe served the dual 
purposes of increasing economic ties and giving Moscow an opportunity to voice 
its anti-American views on European security. The cool winds that began to blow 
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across US-Russian relations towards the end of the Clinton administration have 
intensified and concern a much wider array of issues. In recent press reports, 
President Bush has suggested that future talks with Putin would be feasible, but, 
thus far, the sides have not agreed on any dates, either formal or informal, for 
such a meeting. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
April fool? 
On 1 April, Novaya gazeta placed a message on its web page stating, "The 
Novaya gazeta server has been arrested and closed. When normal server 
functioning will resume is not known. Thank you for being with us." However, 
further investigation of the website produced a subsequent message: "April 
Fools." In order for such a joke to be successful, however, it has to be somewhat 
believable. Alas, its contents are all too credible: 
 
1. On 13 March, The Moscow Times reported that Gazprom had decided to 
scrap a Media-MOST political daily, Segodnya. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 19 
Mar 01) 
2. On 14 March, Communications Minister Leonid Reiman stated that the Kremlin 
was considering the establishment of a government monopoly on radio and TV 
broadcasting. Vremya MN reported that President Vladimir Putin is expected to 
issue a decree soon to establish a state enterprise that will broadcast radio and 
television signals. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Mar 01) 
3. On 17 March, the latest Public Opinion Foundation poll of 1,500 respondents 
from across Russia revealed that "57 percent of those surveyed said that 
censorship of the Russian mass media was needed," and "71 percent of the 
respondents said that there were socially important problems about which the 
media should remain silent." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 23 Mar 01) 
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4. On 25 March, Norbert Strade, moderator of the Chechnya Shortlist, posted the 
following technical message through the reserve mailer for the Shortlist: "For a 
couple of weeks now there have been increasing problems with sending list 
messages to servers located in the Russian Federation." This has affected 
incoming mail to some humanitarian aid and human rights organizations. 
5. In March Berezovsky took control of 75 percent of TV-6 after securing a 37.5-
percent stake from metals tycoon Lev Chernoi; 9 of the 13 board members 
named were allies of Berezovsky. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 2 Apr 01) Berezovsky 
reportedly "does not want to develop TV-6 into a network that opposes the 
government." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 30 Mar 01) 
 
In general, there has been surprisingly little coverage of the Russian media in 
world news lately. This is noteworthy because the lack of coverage does not 
correspond to actual developments concerning Russian media during this period. 
Moscow Times has had some difficulties with its website and readers have been 
forced to obtain access to the newspaper through its Russia-based ".ru" web 
address rather than its ".com" address which is sited beyond Moscow's reach. 
Moreover, there is only ominous silence regarding any possible deal between the 
Turner investment consortium and Gazprom for Western investment in Media-
MOST (the media company's only chance for survival). At this point, it seems 
obvious that the potential deal has evaporated somewhere along the way, and, 
for political reasons, no one is willing to post an obituary. If an issue is ignored for 
a long enough time, the expectation is that it will be forgotten. 
 
As intimated in a previous issue of The NIS Observed, not only did the authorities 
fail to charge Boris Berezovsky in absentia concerning the Aeroflot 
embezzlement case, but he is now in control of TV-6, which reportedly aims to 
replace NTV as the third-most-watched television station in Russia. Igor 
Shabdurasulov, former deputy head of the presidential administration, was 
elected chairman of the TV-6 board of directors. This comes after Berezovsky 
claimed that he wished to save Media-MOST and to preserve press freedoms. 
 12 
Had Berezovsky marched in the 31 March Russian Rally of Free Speech 
Defenders, that might have constituted a "pre-April 1" joke. Mikhail Gorbachev 
was supposed to participate in the rally (of course he didn't); perhaps he felt that 
this would have been too much of a comedy. The rally itself seemed to be an 
ironic farewell to Media-MOST, funded by Media-MOST, complete with rock 
music and balloons. If Media-MOST should survive, it will be in name only and 
not in the spirit of independent television. The Russian press minister, Mikhail 
Lesin, said in an interview that, because the poorly financed Russian media 
companies "lack investments, they have to rely on politicians and people who 
pay them." (THE BOSTON GLOBE, 18 Mar 2001) Media-MOST won't obtain the 
private investment that would ensure its independence -- that much seems clear 
at this point. 
 
It is all the more ominous that Putin has been changing and is continuing to 
change key personnel by replacing Yel'tsin-era members with FSB-affiliated 
individuals (in order "to hasten reform," and centralize government) at the very 
time when the vital signs of free media are fading. That is no joke. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Sergeev out... but what came in? 
On 28 March, President Putin dismissed Marshal Igor Sergeev as defense 
minister and several other senior officials in the Russian defense and security 
apparatus. On the surface, various government spokesmen and papers have 
indicated that this was a logical step in the ongoing reform efforts and a move in 
the right direction towards "demilitarizing" Russian society. However, upon 
further examination, it is clear that the stage may be set now for placing the 
blame concerning continuing setbacks in Chechnya. This is likely to consist of 
finger pointing and further dismissals. Moreover, the apparent takeover of 
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professional military leadership positions by former security officers with strong 
personal loyalties to Putin does not bode well for pluralistic development in the 
"power" apparatus, despite the touted "civilianization" of the defense minister 
post. 
 
Summary of the changes in the defense/security establishment 
In the key leadership positions, the following changes took place: 
**Igor Sergeev retires from the military and the post of defense minister; he 
remains a "presidential aide," presumably in an advisory capacity only; 
**Sergei Ivanov (FSB) moves from the post of Security Council secretary to the 
position of defense minister; 
**Vladimir Rushailo moves from the post of interior minister to replace Ivanov as 
Security Council secretary; 
**Boris Gryzlov, Unity Party parliamentary leader, becomes interior minister; 
**Vladimir Vasilev is named deputy interior minister. 
 
In other positions, the following appointments were made: 
**LtGen Aleksei Moskovsky (FSB) moves together with Ivanov, from deputy 
secretary of the Security Council to deputy defense minister; 
**Vyacheslav Soltaganov is transferred from tax police chief to deputy secretary 
of the Security Council. Mikhail Fradkov becomes the new tax police chief; 
**Igor Puzanov leaves the command of the Moscow Military District to become a 
deputy defense minister; 
**Lyubov Kudelina moves from deputy finance minister to deputy defense 
minister. Her appointment apparently is meant to try to bring further fiscal 
discipline to the armed services. Any progress that she can make in routing out 
financial corruption and widespread embezzlement of defense funds will be a 
needed change. As the first woman appointed into the traditional all-male bastion 
of defense leadership, her challenge to make headway may be difficult to meet. 
Either way, true reform efforts will require greater funding levels, not just better 
accountability of the already scarce funds. 
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The Apparent Winners 
Boris Gryzlov: A relative unknown except for his complete devotion to the 
president, he moves from relative obscurity to assume the powerful position of 
interior minister. 
 
Sergei Ivanov: With the new assignment and assumption of responsibility for 
military reform (moved from the Security Council to the defense ministry) while 
Chechen policy is shifted to the Security Council, he is isolated from what is 
certain to be further fallout from the deteriorating situation in the North Caucasus. 
Putin now has a man in charge of the military completely loyal to him and greater 
FSB influence throughout the state security apparatuses. 
  
Definite and potential losers 
Igor Sergeev 
Once he was granted his third one-year extension past retirement age as 
defense minister, Sergeev's future was the subject of much debate over the past 
year. Disputes over military reform with Chief of the General Staff Anatoly 
Kvashnin, the military disasters of the Kursk incident and continued problems in 
Chechnya had all given rise to rumors of Sergeev's possible replacement. These 
assumptions were given further weight by indications in October that the Security 
Council favored conventional over strategic forces -- again in contrast to 
Sergeev's position. Despite these factors, beginning in late November, Sergeev 
suddenly became the point man in Russia's foreign policy initiatives through arms 
sales around the world. For nearly four months, via international trips followed by 
reciprocal visits, he met with defense officials and foreign leaders to lay the 
groundwork for arms sales to bolster a flagging Russian arms industry. However, 
by mid-March there was a hint he might be on the way out when it was 
announced that he had not requested further extension of his tour of duty. His 
replacement now appears to be honoring the rumored agreement between 
Yel'tsin and Putin during the presidential turnover not to change "power ministry" 
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appointments for at least a year -- Sergeev's dismissal and the chain reaction of 
other appointments occurred on the first anniversary of Putin's election victory. 
 
The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)  
With Sergeev's departure, the SRF may be a loser in the upcoming military 
reform efforts and the subsequent final decisions on how to structure the military. 
The SRF's champion in last summer's conventional forces vs. strategic forces 
debate was Sergeev, a former SRF commander himself. Much already has been 
written about the putative absorption of the SRF and Air Defense Forces into the 
Ground and Air Forces, thereby creating a Russian defense structure centered 
on three main components (Army, Navy, Air Force). This approach now can gain 
more momentum, although a fourth "service" in the form of a newly established 
Space Force appears to be taking shape. 
 
Vladimir Rushailo 
Although Putin emphasized the importance of his new role, Rushailo loses a 
"power" minister's post to take over what seems likely to be a weakened Security 
Council. Much of the Security Council secretary's power under Ivanov appeared 
to come from his close, personal ties to the president. The important job of 
military reform, begun in the Security Council under Ivanov, is now shifting to the 
Ministry of Defense with Ivanov. The Security Council apparently will assume a 
diminished role overall in defense matters; however, according to Putin, its 
attention will be focused on solving the issues in the North Caucasus. 
(INTERFAX DAILY FINANCIAL REPORT, 1629 GMT, 29 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0329, via World News Connection) Given recent press criticism and falling 
public polls concerning the Chechen situation, isolating his loyal supporters from 
blame and establishing a future "fall guy" may be the motivations behind Putin's 
darkhorse appointment of Rushailo. Since the latter is a holdover from the 
Yel'tsin "family" with reported ties to media and oil oligarchs, Chechnya may 
serve as the "whip" to keep him in line or, if necessary, to oust him. 
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Defense Reform Tailored for Real Security Threats 
Past rhetoric and announced plans by Ivanov concerning military reform still 
leave the question whether he has a truly strategic vision of Russian defense 
needs. Ivanov has emphasized that he will exercise sole direction of the armed 
forces and that the chief of staff, General Kvashnin, will work through him rather 
than continue to have direct access to the president. However, Ivanov does not 
bring with him a lifelong commitment of working in the defense arena and the 
consequent knowledge required for thorough reform. Certainly, a long-serving 
Duma defense committee member or other such civilian with significant 
understanding of military issues would be a better choice genuinely to 
"civilianize" the position of defense minister. What Ivanov does bring is a security 
service background and strong loyalty to Putin. He also brings as his deputy 
Aleksei Moskovsky who, like Ivanov, has a security services background. Putin 
claims that, "as you see, in key positions in military bodies, civilians are 
appearing. This has been done deliberately. It is a step towards the 
demilitarization of Russian society." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 Mar 01) What Putin 
really has done is consolidate his grip on power and strengthen further FSB 
control over the "power" ministries, probably at the expense of true military 
reform. To facilitate these goals, in Ivanov Putin has picked the right man. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The making of a martyr 
When Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested on charges of tax evasion and bribery 
shortly after helping to create the anti-presidential National Salvation Forum 
(NSF), she became a rallying point for those attempting to remove President 
Leonid Kuchma from power. Although most admit that many charges against her 
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may be true, Tymoshenko's arrest was viewed as an attack by Kuchma on one of 
his most vocal rivals. 
 
The opposition, which had been demanding the president's resignation since he 
was implicated in the death of journalist Georgy Gongadze, finally had a martyr. 
Opposition members suggested (perhaps correctly, perhaps not) that the former 
deputy prime minister was being mistreated in custody, and was physically weak 
and in pain. Suddenly, Tymoshenko's limited political and popular support 
jumped. Protesters began chanting her name at demonstrations, Western 
organizations pushed for her release, and the NSF quickly became the primary 
opposition organization in the country. Other leaders of her group suggested that 
the arrest would "increase the resolution of the opposition," and called it "a huge 
political mistake." (EASTERN ECONOMIST DAILY, 15 Feb 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Despite these comments, Kuchma managed to weather the protests following his 
rival's arrest. Lately, it has seemed as if he would also outlast his opposition, 
perhaps even using its disorganization and fragmentation to further consolidate 
his power. 
 
However, on 26 March, Kyiv's Pechersky District Court suddenly stood up to 
Kuchma's pressure and ordered Tymoshenko released. The court simply could 
find no reason to keep her detained in solitary confinement until her trial. 
 
For the next several days, the former deputy prime minister picked up where she 
left off when she was arrested on 13 February. From the hospital room where 
she was "recovering from her prison stay," she met with opposition leaders, 
Ukraine's representative to the Council of Europe, members of the press and 
Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. 
 
In her meeting with several journalists, Tymoshenko criticized the idea of 
roundtable talks between the president and opposition members and suggested 
 18 
that only Kuchma's resignation would solve the country's political crisis. She 
emphasized the necessity for all opposition parties to put aside their differences 
and unite in order to accomplish this goal. "For this brief period," she said, "we 
must work out a single common course and start using our ideology only when 
we take part in democratic presidential and parliamentary elections." 
(INTERFAX, 30 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Perhaps most important for its likely impact, Tymoshenko also strongly praised 
Prime Minister Yushchenko, who faces a possible vote of no-confidence in the 
parliament in April. If he were to lose that vote, it is probable that a much less 
reformist and more left-leaning government would follow. But Tymoshenko's 
praise for Yushchenko was unqualified and will probably help him retain his 
position. She suggested the prime minister "is one of the most promising leaders 
in Ukraine" and "a worthy candidate" in the country's next presidential elections, 
whether they be held in 2004 as scheduled or earlier. She also named Oleksandr 
Moroz, Socialist Party leader and the man who released the "Gongadze tapes," 
as another promising candidate. For her part, Tymoshenko promised to organize 
the opposition into an effective, consolidated force "in order to ensure early 
presidential elections." 
 
These statements were obviously too much for Kuchma and his allies to bear. On 
30 March, Tymoshenko was re-arrested, after a Kyiv City Court somehow 
annulled the district court's ruling. Although Tymoshenko was allowed to remain 
at the clinic where she was being treated, fellow Batkivshchina Party member 
Oleksandr Turchinov complained that "the entire floor" had been blocked off by 
police, and that she was allowed no visitors, including a lawyer. (INTERFAX, 31 
Mar 01; via lexis-nexis)  
 
So now, Yulia Tymoshenko's elevation to martyr is nearly complete. Even Prime 
Minister Yushchenko is no longer hiding his dismay at the treatment of his former 
deputy. The arrest, he said, is a "demonstration of force and a disappointing 
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episode, which suspends negotiations between the opposition and the authorities 
about the way to overcome the political crisis.... It is difficult to carry out 
negotiations when a side is behind bars." (ITAR-TASS, 1 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Tymoshenko's fellow opposition members at first seemed stunned by the 
arbitrariness of the act, but now vow to stop all discussions and step up their 
actions against Kuchma. "This is precisely the authorities' answer concerning the 
way it wants the talks to be held, and there will be an attempt to settle the 
situation in Ukraine forcefully," Turchinov said, adding, "Starting next week, new 
mass rallies." (INTERFAX, 31 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) And very possibly new 
violence, as the opposition begins a new round of demonstrations -- 
demonstrations held, of course, in the name of Yulia. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Will Russia finally get its 'peacekeeping' reward? 
A funny thing happened on the way to the new Communist government in 
Moldova -- Russia began making Dniestr negotiations a priority. Moscow's 
representatives stepped up criticism of Dniestr authorities and praise of Chisinau. 
They began suggesting that Tiraspol was the primary cause of the failure to 
reach a settlement, and they began claiming that a settlement could be reached 
in as little as six weeks -- if Tiraspol did not get in the way.  
 
While Russia's use of "uncooperative" Tiraspol leaders as an excuse for not 
fulfilling agreements to remove troops and weapons from Dniestr is nothing new, 
the current rhetoric differs from previous versions in two ways. First, Russia's 
latest statements criticize Tiraspol for standing in the way of the settlement of the 
entire Dniestr question, but barely make any mention of troop or weapons 
removal. Second, the vitriolic level of the rhetoric is almost demonizing in its 
effect. In past statements, Russia has taken care not to alienate Dniestr 
authorities completely. Seemingly this is no longer the case, which suggests that 
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an agreement between Communist Party President Vladimir Voronin and 
Russian representatives may have been reached. 
 
On 22 March, Boris Pastukhov, the head of the Russian Duma committee for CIS 
relations, announced, "We have noticed that Chisinau is ready to reach an 
understanding [to resolve the Dniestr issue]," but slammed Tiraspol officials for 
wanting the "preservation of the current state of the conflict." He added, "They 
are kings in this kingdom, where neither law nor good breeding exists," and said 
Russia would "no longer tolerate . . . the folly, incompetence, impudence [of 
those who delay the negotiation process]." He also sharply criticized Dniestr 
officials for not destroying "their" weapons. (BESAPRESS, 1800 GMT, 22 Mar 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0322, via World News Connection) 
 
The Moldovan Communist Party newspaper followed up on Pastukhov's visit with 
a revealing article suggesting the need for Russian troops to remain in Dniestr. 
The Kommunist said, "In the interest of our state, we should look again at the old 
position of intransigence to the presence of a limited number of Russian troops 
on our territory." It continued, "Our proclaimed neutrality is no use for 
guaranteeing our security, and we should be no exception to the rule if we ended 
up between two hostile groups." (REUTERS, 30 Mar 01; via Russia Today)  
 
It appears, therefore, that Moscow and Chisinau are preparing for an 
announcement suggesting that the unpredictability of Tiraspol officials, combined 
with their refusal to cooperate with agreements for weapons destruction, 
necessitates the need for Russian peacekeepers in the Transdniestr area. 
Consequently, the 2,000 or so troops currently stationed there will remain, but 
under the auspices of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. In this way, the 
announcement will suggest, not only Moldova's internal stability, but also her 
external security, will be ensured. Of course, the fact that no country except 
Russia has shown any interest in controlling Moldovan territory is not likely to be 
discussed. 
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It would not be surprising if such an agreement were signed shortly after 
Yevgeny Primakov's anticipated arrival in Moldova around mid-April. Sadly, that 
agreement would signal a sharp decrease, if not an end, to Moldova's Western 
orientation, and perhaps also to its involvement in GUUAM, and would make the 
country little more than a Russian satellite. It should be noted, however, that had 
Russia been forced by international organizations to live up to previous promises 
to withdraw its troops, there would be no troops on Moldovan territory today and 
no question of them remaining. The Russians' patience easily surpassed the 
combined will of the international community, and it appears they will soon be 
rewarded for it. There is a lesson in that somewhere. (For background on 
Russian promises to withdraw from Moldova, see BEHIND THE BREAKING 
NEWS, Vol. 1, No. 4; www.bu.edu/iscip.) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
How it all began 
In the beginning there was an acronym (FSK) and it was bad. It seems to be 
responsible for the bungled coup attempt against Chechnya's President 
Dzhokhar Dudaev in November 1994, which made war with Chechnya a 
certainty. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 10 May 99) The person most responsible 
for elaborating that colossal failure was Sergei Stepashin, the director of the FSK 
(renamed FSB), and a close ally of President Putin. Now Stepashin heads the 
Accounting Chamber. However, many accounts of the war don't start with the 
bungled covert operation in November 1994, but with the tragic December 
invasion. And for that the blame goes to Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. 
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In a recent interview Grachev tried to clear his name and pass the blame to 
former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. (TRUD, 15 Mar 01) This attempt is 
not entirely convincing but it does contain some interesting comments about the 
circumstances in which the war was hatched. 
 
In the interview Grachev insists that, after his advice to send paratroopers into 
Chechnya in 1991 was not heeded, he was no longer privy to the upper-level 
decision making on relations with Chechnya. He repeatedly insists that the top 
circles favored political means and that "Yel'tsin had put everything into [Prime 
Minister Yegor] Gaidar's and then [Prime Minister Viktor] Chernomyrdin's hands." 
But he also says that, even in the earliest period, "The leaders of the government 
and those close to Yel'tsin thought that serious negotiations with Chechen 
leaders would be demeaning, to put it mildly. Although I know that Dudaev 
himself really wanted to meet with Yel'tsin or with Gaidar." According to Grachev, 
there was no overarching coordinated policy; each ministry had its own plans. 
"The FSB had its own goals, of which I, as the defense minister, knew nothing. 
The army was supposed to be involved only to help the border guards to block 
the border with the rebel republic."  
 
The Russian leadership apparently had committed itself very early to resolving 
the crisis with Chechnya by blockading the republic, thereby provoking a revolt 
which would unseat Dudaev. "It was said at the time: If we close off all the 
lifelines to the republic, even to the point of starving the population, then the 
ordinary Chechens will understand where the regime is going and will overthrow 
it themselves. And this was quite in earnest, since there were parallel attempts to 
find a leader to replace Dudaev and lead the Chechens. Until 1993 Khasbulatov's 
candidacy was discussed, and then there was only one name, Doku Zavgaev. 
He was the former party leader of the republic and he was being readied for the 
leadership role." 
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A blockade was indeed imposed on Chechnya in 1994, but a popular revolt was 
slow in coming and the FSK (FSB) began to lose patience. "I only guessed that 
some kind of force measure was being prepared, under the wing of the FSB. 
Then a representative of our ministry had to be appointed to the coordinating 
body. The head of the General Staff, Mikhail Ivanovich Kolesnikov, became that 
representative. All that was asked of us was some equipment and volunteers to 
help the border guards and the FSB. I categorically forbade Kolesnikov to get 
draftees involved in this operation. But they were not needed. Many warrant 
officers (praporschiki) of the Taman and Kantemirov Divisions agreed to 
participate in the operation since they would get paid." Grachev does not mention 
that the nature of the operation was not revealed to the volunteers and that their 
identification was taken away. When Dudaev's forces captured 70 Russian 
servicemen in the middle of Grozny in November 1994, Grachev initially denied 
that they were his men. 
 
This debacle prompted the (Russian) Security Council meetings of 28 and 29 
November 1994 where the fateful decision to undertake a full-scale invasion of 
Chechnya was sealed. According to Grachev, Nikolai Yegorov and especially 
Viktor Chernomyrdin spoke in favor of invasion and accused Grachev of 
cowardice for his opposition to the idea. In this, Grachev's account sharply 
contrasts previously available accounts, which suggest that all the participants 
endorsed the decision which was made prior to the meeting. According to 
another Security Council meeting participant, Justice Minister Yuri Kalmykov 
(who opposed the invasion and was forced to resign), the Security Council 
members voted on the documents authorizing the invasion before any discussion 
was held. [John Dunlop, RUSSIA CONFRONTS CHECHNYA: ROOTS OF A 
SEPARATIST CONFLICT (Cambridge University Press: 1998), p. 207]  
 
Similarly, a recent publication authored by several former staff members of the 
Yel'tsin administration (including Yel'tsin aide and Defense Council Secretary 
Yuri Baturin) who rely on detailed logs of Kremlin appointments, shows that 
 24 
Yel'tsin had reached the decision before the meeting and removed those who 
opposed the invasion from the decision-making process. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 26 
Feb 01) On 28 November the text of Yel'tsin's ultimatum calling on the Chechens 
to lay down their arms was authored in consultation with Chernomyrdin, Ivan 
Rybkin, Oleg Lobov, Yegorov, Viktor Yerin, and Stepashin. On 29 November 
Yel'tsin met with Chernomyrdin for three hours. Then he saw Sergei Filatov, who 
proposed a draft decree instituting a state of emergency in Chechnya and 
bringing in interior troops, which was rejected. Then the president saw Baturin, 
who opposed the invasion. This suggests that the Security Council meeting that 
evening formalized a decision which had been made at an earlier date through a 
process that remains inscrutable. 
 
In the interview with Trud, Grachev misrepresents the nature and the significance 
of the discussion at the Security Council and Chernomyrdin's role in the 
proceedings. According to Baturin's account, which appeared in Novaya gazeta, 
Chernomyrdin sought a peaceful solution as late as 16 December by declaring 
his willingness to hold talks with Dudaev. This accords with another account by a 
Federation Council deputy, Viktor Kyrochkin, who describes talks he held with 
Dudaev and Chernomyrdin's representative, Nikolai Semenov, in early March 
1995. They reached an agreement on a cease-fire and commencement of 
negotiations while postponing the question of Chechnya's status. The agreement 
was signed by Semenov and Dudaev and had the consent of the Chechen field 
commanders. When Yel'tsin failed to endorse the agreement, Chernomyrdin 
disavowed it also. [Viktor Kyrochkin, MISSION TO CHECHNYA (Moscow: 1997), 
pp. 60-72] Kyrochkin comments that in March the commanders would have 
accepted almost any terms; they didn't even ask for a complete withdrawal of 
Russian forces. It was early in the war, Grozny had fallen, but the field 
commanders still had families. The slaughter of civilians in the countryside came 
in April and made future talks far more problematic. 
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In July 1995, when Shamil Basaev raided a hospital in Budennovsk, 
Chernomyrdin promised peace talks in return for hostages. The ensuing talks 
and cease-fire lasted three months, and some in the military have blamed their 
subsequent defeat on this interruption in the campaign which gave the Chechen 
resistance an opportunity to regroup. Although Grachev's contention that he was 
not among the top circle of advisers pushing Yel'tsin to war seems highly 
plausible, he would be far more convincing if he passed the blame to one of the 
known hawks -- Yegorov, Shakhrai, Yerin, or Stepashin. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Kazakhstan  
Export route for Caspian oil to Europe via Russia 
The Caspian region and its potentially vast energy resources are high on 
Russia's strategic agenda. Two oil fields in Kazakhstan -- Tengiz and Kashagan -
- have been the foci of recent international endeavors with political as well as 
economic ramifications. On 26 March, Kazakhstan and Russia opened a 1,580-
km pipeline transporting oil from the Caspian basin to the Russian Black Sea port 
of Novorossiisk, increasing Russia's geopolitical and economic leverage in the 
region. Offsetting that, however, was Kazakhstan's decision to sign on also to 
plans for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia opposes. 
 
The $2.3-billion Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) project will provide a key 
export route for Kazakhstan's onshore Tengiz oil field, and is the first of its kind in 
the region. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister of Fuel and Energy Vladimir Stanev 
said "participation of Russia and Kazakhstan in the project confirms our joint 
strategic commitment to the creation of a balanced and mutually beneficial 
system for the development and use of the Caspian resources." (ITAR-TASS, 
1411 GMT, 26 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) Indeed, Russia is doing whatever it can to 
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consolidate its economic ties and strengthen its "strategic partnership" with 
Kazakhstan, the key to Russian Caspian policy due to its geographic location 
and vast energy resources.  
 
Kazakhstan produces approximately 400,000 barrels per day and is the second 
largest oil producer after Russia among the former Soviet states. Tengiz 
purportedly contains between 6 and 9 billion barrels of crude oil. (ENERGY 
OVERVIEW OF KAZAKHSTAN; via www.fe.doe.gov) It will take approximately 
100 days for the oil to fill the pipeline and reach Novorossiisk, where the first 
tanker will be loaded in June. Chevron, which has a 15-percent stake in the CPC 
pipeline, said the line would transport Tengiz crude as well as oil from other 
Kazakh and Russian oil fields. Initially the pipeline will transport 560,000 barrels 
per day and ultimately will be capable of exporting 1.5 million barrels per day of 
crude oil. (AFX NEWS, 26 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) Russia and Kazakhstan are 
the main shareholders of the CPC pipeline. Other shareholders include various 
West European and Central Asian entities. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 26 Mar 01) 
Nurlan Balgimbaev, president of Kazakhoil, said, "The pipeline connects 
Kazakhstan to Europe through Russia. I hope this is the first of several pipelines 
that Kazakhstan needs." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 26 Mar 01; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
The landlocked Caspian states are not depending solely on ventures with 
Russia, however; they clearly endorse multiple transport corridors for exporting 
their energy resources. The United States is lobbying heavily for the $2.5-billion 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and is relying on Kazakhstan's oil to ensure the 
profitability of the east-west transit corridor. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 17 Jan 
01) On 1 March, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the United States 
signed a memorandum of understanding in Kazakhstan's capital Astana on the 
planned 1,730-km pipeline. The memorandum of understanding represents a 
watershed by providing the framework for Kazakhstan to join the project and 
export Kazakh oil to world markets via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route. 
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(ANATOLIA, 1344 GMT, 1 Mar 01; FBIS-WEU-2001-0301, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Elizabeth Jones, America's envoy to the Caspian and former ambassador to 
Kazakhstan, reported that Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev fully 
supports the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and has guaranteed that the first 
Kazakh oil from the offshore Kashagan field on the Caspian shelf will be 
transported via that pipeline route. (INTERFAX, 2 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) 
Kashagan, a recent discovery that could make Kazakhstan one of the world's 
leading oil producers, could hold 50 billion barrels of oil, making it the second 
largest oil field after Saudi Arabia's Ghawar oil field, which contains 70 billion 
barrels of oil. (CASPIAN CROSSROADS, Summer/Fall 2000) Kashagan and the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline are due to start operations in 2004-2005. (AFX 
NEWS, 2 Mar 01; via lexis-nexis) Unquestionably, Western energy security 
depends on increasing access to energy resources outside the Middle East, such 
as the Caspian region, and establishing energy transport corridors that bypass 
Iran and Russia. 
 
Russia may be softening its hard-line position on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route. 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny, Russia's envoy to the 
Caspian, recently downplayed any conflict with the planned energy corridor 
through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, saying it would not affect Russian 
interests. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 Mar 01) 
 
Additionally, the CPC pipeline does not possess the capacity for all the Caspian 
oil that could be produced in the future. While Russia has criticized openly the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Russian oil companies have not displayed any 
such hostility. In fact, Russian oil companies such as LUKoil and Gazprom may 
also use the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline if they discover more oil in the Caspian 
basin. More importantly, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would lessen the 
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Caspian states' heavy dependence on Russia for transport routes. (THE 
ECONOMIST, 10 Mar 01) 
 
Although Russia, which still regards the Caspian region as its sphere of 
influence, certainly has gained a competitive edge in controlling Caspian energy 
resources, historical ties and the CPC pipeline do not preclude de facto 
development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route. Kazakhstan's willingness to foster 
relations with both Russia and the West signals the country's awareness of its 
opportunities. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Kin 'grievances' for Russian domestic consumption 
The Russian administration once more has decried the allegedly dismal plight of 
Russians in the Baltic states, primarily for Russian domestic consumption. 
However, the expressions of concern have allowed glimpses into a kinder, 
gentler Vladimir Putin, who has ratcheted down the rhetoric concerning actions 
Russia will take to effect change. One can assume that the international 
community's refusal to accept earlier rants about the Baltic states (or the 
premises of those complaints in the face of refutations by numerous agencies) 
may have shown Russia that the West does not believe in Moscow's tears. 
 
Now, the tactic appears to be a propaganda war of attrition. Clearly hoping that 
repetition of time-worn charges still might result in acceptance of those charges, 
at least on the domestic front, Russia's Deputy Minister for Labor and Social 
Development, Galina Karelova, used the 45th session of the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women as a springboard to explain the gender 
issues of purported discrimination. While it took some verbal gymnastics, the 
deputy minister managed to link charges of such discrimination with the purpose 
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of her trip to New York. Speaking to Itar-Tass, Karelova claimed that in the Baltic 
states "manifestations of anti-Russian moods can be seen at all the levels of 
public and economic life." She said that almost one million persons have suffered 
from systematic discrimination, including an absence of citizenship, which she 
described as one of the "shrewdest forms of xenophobia and ethnic 
discrimination," which "women are practically the first to suffer from." (ITAR-
TASS, 0936 GMT, 14 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0314, via World News 
Connection) Alas, while Karelova proved adept at connecting some heretofore-
unconnected dots, she was incapable of connecting others, specifically meeting 
citizenship requirements and obtaining citizenship. Perhaps it's too obvious. 
 
Her boss also expressed concern, in an interview with Russian newspapers, that 
"relations with the Russian-speaking population are especially difficult in some of 
[the Baltic] countries." "They even invented a new term there: non-citizens. There 
are 600,000 such 'non-citizens' in Latvia. This is a matter of special concern and 
anxiety for us," Putin added. He was quick to tame any incendiary sparks that 
might result from Russia's outrage, however. "It would be in the interests of our 
compatriots in those countries, if we avoided confrontation... We should defend 
the interests of the Russian-speaking population patiently and persistently. I 
repeat once again that this should be done in the civilized process of a dialogue." 
(ITAR-TASS, 0735 GMT, 22 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0322, via World News 
Connection) And, if patience and persistence don't work, there's always the 
nuclear option -- at least according to Sergei Ivanov, former secretary of Russia's 
Security Council and now Minister of Defense. Asserting that tactical nuclear 
weapons have not been deployed in the Kaliningrad enclave -- yet -- Ivanov 
explained that Moscow "has not made an agreement with the international 
community not to deploy" such weapons there in the future. (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 1833 GMT, 25 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0325, via World News 
Connection) 
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Although the international community has not swallowed Moscow's line 
completely, recommendations continue to spew forth concerning easing the 
assimilation process. The European Union, while supporting Estonia's work 
toward domestic integration of ethnic minorities, recently pointed out a few areas 
to which Estonia should pay more attention. Primarily these concern the use of 
the official language in the private sector and linguistic requirements for electoral 
candidates. (BNS, 1442 GMT, 16 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0316, via World News 
Connection) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High 
Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities Max van der Stoel also submitted some 
recommendations to Latvia regarding the level of bureaucracy attached to 
language proficiency examinations. (BNS, 1717 GMT, 22 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0322, via World News Connection) Van der Stoel also said that using the 
required State Language Center proficiency certificate as the only accepted proof 
of fluency should be reconsidered. (LETA, 0737 GMT, 23 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0323, via World News Connection) 
 
Certainly the language barrier won't be breached any time soon in Estonia. A 
Center Party bill proposing that the State Chancellery have all laws and 
government regulations translated into Russian failed in the first reading and has 
been dropped from parliament's agenda. (BNS, 1910 GMT, 21 Mar 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0321, via World News Connection) 
 
To build or not to build 
Anticipating a favorable outcome to the 2002 NATO summit, two of the three 
Baltic states have been discussing -- publicly -- whether NATO bases will appear 
on their territory. The verdict depends in part on geography and existing 
relations. 
 
One of the two states which have continued to be the focus of Russian rhetoric is 
relying on the NATO alliance to help secure the country's future and, therefore, is 
more than willing to make concessions that would add to that security. Thus, 
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Estonian Defense Forces Commander Rear Admiral Tarmo Kouts said his 
country may permit NATO to build military bases on its territory once the country 
enters the alliance. Dismissing Russian warnings of deteriorating relations, Kouts 
said similar fears, expressed before Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
joined NATO, proved groundless. "Estonia doesn't regard Russia as its enemy, 
since it sees an enemy only in those who seek to attack its independence," Kouts 
said. (BNS, 1805 GMT, 19 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0319, via World News 
Connection) Clearly he, too, saw the kinder, gentler Putin emerging in the 
neighboring country. 
 
On the other hand, Lithuania -- betwixt and between Russia and its Kaliningrad 
enclave (where there may or may not be tactical nuclear weapons... yet) -- is not 
as sanguine about the possibility of hosting NATO military bases. Indeed, 
President Valdas Adamkus said that, if Lithuania is admitted to NATO, "there will 
be no military bases and divisions of the alliance on its territory." Asserting, as 
Baltic statesmen do, that NATO expansion would not pose a threat to Russia, 
Adamkus offered a motive for a complete Russian turnaround on the subject of 
enlargement. By joining NATO, he said, Lithuania "could become a bridge of 
goodwill and trust between NATO and Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 0951 GMT, 23 Mar 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0324, via World News Connection)  
 
LITHUANIA 
The issue of transit 
While not assuming that Baltic accession to NATO is a given, the Lithuanian and 
Russian presidents did work on the assumption that the Baltic path to the 
European Union will be smooth. The meeting of the presidents last week in 
Moscow focused primarily on Kaliningrad's future after Lithuanian joins the EU. 
That focus came as no surprise; during the planning stage for the get-together, 
Russian negotiators made clear that some subjects were acceptable, and others 
were not. The latter category included Lithuanian claims for compensation for 
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damage inflicted during the Soviet occupation, which the current leadership in 
Lithuania inherited, much to its chagrin, with a referendum-based mandate. 
 
In the leadup to the meeting, Adamkus made it quite clear that he was not 
interested in anything but the maintenance of "friendly and even exemplary" 
relations with Russia. "There is no confrontation and no such issues upon which 
we are not willing to agree," he said. (RIA, 0826 GMT, 23 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0323, via World News Connection) And, true to form, agreement reportedly 
was reached on some issues concerning movement of persons and military 
equipment between Kaliningrad and Russia. While few details have emerged, 
Moscow seems to have been assured that EU frontiers should serve as no 
barrier affecting access to its enclave. "I don't think there are any acute problems 
between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region. We have found answers, though 
not all of them. But still, we have achieved good progress," Valdas Adamkus said 
after the meeting. Kaliningrad's future is linked "to the expansion of the European 
Union, to those processes which are taking place in Europe and in which 
Lithuania has become very actively involved," he said. (INTERFAX, 31 Mar 01; 
via lexis-nexis) 
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